NDC Conferences YouTube · May 7, 2026

Breaking the Black Box: Why Testing Generative AI Is Full Spectrum - Jason Ross - NDC Security 2026

Breaking the Black Box: Why Testing Generative AI Is Full Spectrum - Jason Ross - NDC Security 2026 video thumbnail
Why it matters

NDC Security 2026 talk on testing generative AI systems, arguing that AI red teaming needs to evaluate variable behavior, safety boundaries, and AI-assisted testing methods rather than a single exploit result.

My takeaway: Breaking the Black Box: Why Testing Generative AI Is Full Spectrum - Jason Ross - NDC Security 2026 is a model-evaluation signal. The practical read is to move AI testing beyond binary pass/fail results into behavioral coverage, safety regressions, and repeatable test harnesses.
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