Trail of Bits Blog · September 18, 2026

Auditing in the age of (good enough) AI

analysis Featured · 92/100 practical score AI Red TeamingAI EngineeringModel Evaluation
Why it matters

Trail of Bits describes an audit methodology using agents to build a decompiler, static analysis and Lean models before reviewing the Miden VM. Public code and regression checks support security findings and 95 machine-checked proofs, with people reviewing what the theorems establish.

My takeaway: Use agents to implement audit tooling and regression tests, then independently validate findings, model assumptions and theorem statements. A checked proof only supports the property and semantics that were encoded.
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